Do the Dutch "rally 'round their flag"?: The effect of military and non-military crises on the Dutch public opinion by Kester, Jeroen
  
Jeroen Kester 
Master Thesis  
Political Communication, Public Opinion, and Political Behavior 
Instructor: Dr. M.F. Meffert 
Leiden University 
 
 
 
Do the Dutch “rally ‘round their flag”? 
The effect of military and non-military crises on the Dutch public opinion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2 
 
 
Table of content 
Introduction.................................................................................................................... 3 
 
Theory and hypotheses ................................................................................................... 6 
FUNDAMENTS OF THE “RALLY-‘ROUND-THE-FLAG”-LITERATURE  ....................................... 6 
THE INFLUENCE OF SYSTEMIC DIFFERENCES ON THE RALLY-EFFECT .................................... 8 
EXPECTATIONS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE – SCATTERED RESPONSIBILITY ............................... 11 
EXPECTATIONS: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES – PRE-EVENT APPROVAL/SUPPORT ..................... 13 
EXPECTATIONS: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES – TYPE OF EVENT ............................................. 13 
 
Method ......................................................................................................................... 16 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ................................................... 16 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE ...................................................... 19 
 
Descriptive analysis of changes in approval and support ........................................... 21 
GOVERNMENT APPROVAL .............................................................................................. 21 
APPROVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER ................................................................................ 22 
DIFFERENCE APPROVAL RATINGS FOR TYPES OF EVENTS................................................... 23 
PARTY SUPPORT: GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION .............................................................. 25 
DIFFERENCE PARTY SUPPORT FOR TYPES OF EVENTS........................................................ 27 
PARTY OF THE PRIME MINISTER ...................................................................................... 28 
PRE-CRISIS POPULARITY  .............................................................................................. 31 
 
Regression analysis: type of event and pre-crisis popularity ...................................... 32 
 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 36 
 
Implications.................................................................................................................. 41 
 
References .................................................................................................................... 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3 
Introduction 
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the eleventh of September 2001 polling 
organizations registered one of the steepest upheavals of a president’s popular support 
among American voters in modern history. George W. Bush his approval rates went 
up dramatically after these dramatic attacks on American soil took place
1
. His job 
approval rating increased with 35 percentage points – from 51 percent prior to and 86 
percent after the attack on the World Trade Center. Scholars considered it to be one of 
the most obvious examples of Mueller’s “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect (Mueller 1970; 
Baum 2002; Hetherington & Nelson 2003).  
 
In the early 1970’s this phenomenon was introduced by Mueller, who anticipates that 
“international crises and similar phenomena will give a President a short-term boost 
in popularity” (1970, 20). Even before Mueller introduced the phenomenon, scholars 
have acknowledged the effect of international crises on presidential popularity. Early 
in the twentieth century, Matthews found that crises or wars can bring about a certain 
stability to the political arena. During such a period of relative stability, political elites 
refrain from partisan activism, or even let go of their tendency to exert control over 
the policy of executive parties (Matthews 1919, 213). In other words, such events can 
move members of the opposition to ‘put politics aside’.  
 
There are, however, some peculiarities to this sudden state of conciliation between 
political elites. First of all, there is no perfect sense of unanimity. The policy stances 
of coalition and opposition parties remain the same, regardless of the crisis. The only 
difference is that these policy differences are latent as soon as the crisis takes place. 
Besides that, the political stability that appeared after a crisis is only temporary. After 
a particular period, elites become more likely to differ on the policy how to solve the 
crisis or conflict (Matthews 1919, 214). Subsequently, the public updates its opinion 
as soon as more information about the crisis and the actions of the government 
reaches media agencies. The details that become transparent, ultimately used by the 
opposition to confront the government, may conflict with the information coming 
from the administration. This leads to an evaporation of the initial public support for 
                                                        
1 Gallup Polls, September 7-10 and 14-15, 2001. Other major polling organizations recorded 
similar approval ratings (e.g., 86% in a poll held on September 13, 2001 by ABC News/Washington 
Post and 84% in a September 13-14, 2001, CBS News/New York Times poll).  
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the incumbent, perhaps even falling back below pre-crisis levels (Brody 1984; Brody 
and Shapiro 1989).  
 
This point seems to be reached in the Netherlands in the aftermath of the crash of 
flight MH17, the commercial airplane brought above Ukraine supposedly brought 
down by Russian separatists
2
. In the beginning of 2015, more than six months after 
the crash, opposition parties openly question the specifications of the crisis and have 
come to openly criticize the decisions made by the government prior to and directly 
after this dramatic event. In a parliamentary debate in February this year, several 
ministers who were involved in the decision-making process were called to, among 
other things, account for the considerations of the government to prohibit commercial 
flights on the particular route flight MH17 took on the 17
th
 of July last year
3
. 
Opposition parties accused the government to have ignored warnings of NATO-
officials who stated that pro-Russian separatists were practicing with rocket launchers 
west of the boarders of Ukraine, right beneath the flight route of MH17.  
 
This belated assertiveness of the opposition parties regarding the incident should draw 
the interest of scholars specializing in the field of the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect. 
Such behavior of members of the opposition, and the subsequent critical sentiment in 
the reports of the media on the disputes in Parliament, is one of the acknowledged 
characteristics of a “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Brody 
1991; Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Until now, few studies on phenomenon have 
been done outside the United States to make claims on its workings in other political 
systems, in which the incumbent holds less responsibility than in the presidential 
system the United States have. Recent events involving the Netherlands, thus make it 
relevant to ask the question: is the ‘rally-round-flag’-effect a product of the political 
system or is it a generic phenomenon in other types of political system as well? In 
                                                        
2 On the 17th of July a commercial flight of Malaysia Airlines crashed above Ukraine on its way to Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. Among the 298 passengers on board of that plane, including a large number of Dutch 
citizens, there were no survivors. Although not confirmed by an official investigation task force, a missile of 
Russian separatists in Ukraine hit the plane. Until the day this thesis is final no official international 
investigation has been launched in which possible perpetrators are being prosecuted for taking part in the 
takedown of flight MH17. Volkskrant. Dossier rampvlucht MH17. http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-
rampvlucht-mh17/ 
3 Volkskrant. 5th of February 2015. ‘Ministers houden vol dat zij niets wisten van risico voor MH17’. Last 
consulted on February 17th of 2015.  
http://www.volkskrant.nl/politiek/ministers-houden-vol-dat-zij-niets-wisten-van-risico-voor-
mh17~a3845493/   
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other words, do crises involving the Netherlands have an impact the public opinion 
although it has a parliamentarian system and responsibility is considered to be more 
scattered?  
 
To learn more about the workings of this phenomenon, it is relevant to transplant the 
existing ideas of the rally-effect in previous studies to a political system in which the 
clarity of responsibility is not as centered as in presidential systems, but power is 
considered to be more diffused over different political institutions instead. With this 
effort to study the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect in the Netherlands, more can be 
stated about the workings of the phenomenon in other political systems than the 
presidential system. This study therewith aims to be a useful supplement of the 
literature on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect and hopes to stimulate studies in other 
countries, and thus political systems.  
 
Besides its effort to complement the scholarly literature on the theory, it is socially 
relevant to investigate how the electorate reacts following from different types of 
dramatic events. Although polling agencies are inclined to relate upheavals in 
approval ratings or support to certain political events, it remains difficult to solidify 
where sudden leaps in approval or support are coming from. Measuring the effect of 
multiple rally-events throughout present history would help to interpret dramatic 
changes in approval ratings of the incumbent. Measuring to what degree the “rally-
‘round-the-flag”-effect is applicable to the Netherlands should also prevent one from 
making slender claims about the functioning of incumbents. It would, namely, be too 
premature to state that these sudden changes in approval ratings are caused by specific 
performances initiated by the incumbent. As will be discussed in the theoretical 
framework, the evaluations of incumbents simply increase because they simply are 
the leader at that time. This study should give an indication of the events that could 
have caused for such changes in polls.   
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Theory & hypotheses 
Fundaments of the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-literature 
Mueller, as the first scholar who operationalized the ‘rally-round-the-flag’-effect in 
the early 1970’s, stated that crises have the potential to elicit a sense of unification of 
the public. One of the subsequent reactions of the public after a crisis is that it rallies 
around the President. According to Mueller, a potential rally event must meet three 
characteristics: it “(1) is international and (2) involves the United States and 
particularly the president directly; and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply 
focused” (1973, 209). According to Mueller, the reason why apparent spikes in 
presidential popularity emerge after international crises is that the electorate is afraid 
to constrain the nation’s chances of success in the midst of the crisis if it would not 
support him.  
 
Basically all relevant follow-ups of Mueller’s introduction of the phenomenon agreed 
with Mueller that international events directly involving the United States indeed 
evoke the public to change its stance towards the incumbent (Lee 1977; Kernell 1978; 
MacKuen 1983; Wittkopf & De Haven 1987; Ostrom & Simon 1985; Marra, Ostrom 
& Simon 1990). Others, on the other hand, said to have found enough reason to doubt 
the direct impact of rally-events on fluctuations in presidential popularity, as the rally-
effect for a substantial number of cases has found to be influenced by the extent to 
which media pay attention to the particular event (Blechman & Kaplan 1978; Brody 
& Shapiro 1989; Edwards 1990; Hugick & Gallup 1991; James & Oneal 1991; Brody 
1991; Lian & Oneal 1993; DeRouen 1995; Oneal & Bryan 1995). The press mediates 
the influence of leaders after a certain event and is therefore claimed to be an 
important determinant in whether rally-events will affect evaluations of the 
incumbent.   
 
In the early studies on the phenomenon, only minor refinements on the workings of 
the theory itself have appeared (Lee 1977; Kernell 1978; MacKuen 1983), confirming 
that international crises could cause for a short-run increase of presidential popularity 
unrelated to the success of his policies. The early literature on the “rally-‘round-the-
flag”-effect was rather unanimous in concluding that rally effects were substantial, 
automatic and short-run responses from the public to an international crisis, 
increasing the popularity of the incumbent regardless of the popular support for his 
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views. Polsby (1971, 112) states that “Invariably, the popular response to a President 
during international crises is favorable, regardless of the wisdom of the policies he 
pursues.”  
 
While early literature on the rally-effect considered rallies to be products of reflexive 
patriotic reactions of the public opinion, later studies have found that the contextual 
nature of the rally-event taking place, such as opinion leadership, media coverage and 
the characteristics of the public determine whether a “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect 
appears and, if so, the degree of the impact on the public (Baker and Oneal 2001; 
Brody and Shapiro 1989). Moreover, more recent studies have found that reactions of 
the public on different types of events vary, concluding that the impact of military 
events is rather small (Baker and Oneal 2001; Brody 1984; Brody 1991; Jentelson 
1992; Jentelson and Britton 1998; Lian and Oneal 1993; Oneal and Bryan 1995). 
Baker and Oneal (2001), for example, performed a substantive investigation on the 
rally-effect in the United States by investigating 193 militarized disputes during the 
period of 1933 and 1992 from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set. They 
conclude that the overall rally-effect during this extensive time span was nearly zero. 
Moreover, they have found that when military events did affect evaluations of the 
incumbent, the changes were small and context-dependent. The magnitude of the 
rally-event was dependent on the prominence of media coverage, the level of 
hostility, public statements by the incumbent about the crisis, the support the 
opposition was willing to provide, the level of approval of the incumbent and the 
country that initiated the military dispute (Baker & Oneal 2001). 
 
Besides determining when rally-effects have occurred, other scholars have focused 
more on mechanisms of the phenomenon. Brody and Shapiro (1989) investigated why 
the attention of the media, the public and other societal institutions is directed 
immediately to the incumbent after a particular rally-event takes place. They argue 
that, immediately after the crisis, the incumbent has a monopoly on information about 
the specifications of the event. The opposition therewith lacks crucial intelligence on 
the event and is, therefore, unable to criticize the public fearing to come across as 
uninformed. Apart from its political goals, the opposition is left with no other choice 
than to stay silent, or even show a sense of support, temporarily. The partisan debate 
that is normally featured and emphasized in democratic systems, is replaced by a 
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bipartisan elite unification. This causes for the public to form its initial opinion based 
almost solely on statements of the incumbent or his administration.  
 
It is, however, only a matter of time that more information becomes available on the 
specifications of the crisis and the privileged position of the president and his 
administration erodes when it comes to intelligence. Media and opposition leaders 
become encouraged to present their views on the specific crisis using the new 
information that is gathered through approaching other sources than the official 
channels of the government. Opposition leaders take a more critical stance on the 
president’s performance, evaluating his actions before, during or after the crisis and 
his policies as whole. Accordingly, the electorate is confronted with more complete, 
and in most cases conflicting, information coming from all kinds of sources and 
updates its evaluation on the performance of the incumbent. The initial public support 
for the incumbent decreases gradually, perhaps falling back to pre-level crisis (Brody 
1984; Brody and Shapiro 1989). 
 
The influence of systemic differences on the rally-effect 
When examining the substantial scholarly work on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect, 
it becomes clear that the United States is the homeland of the phenomenon. Since 
Mueller (1970) has found that wars and international crises can have an instant impact 
on approval rates of presidents, conceptual refinements and empirical research on the 
phenomenon have been mainly focusing on the United States (Brody & Shapiro 1989; 
Brody 1991, Oneal & Bryan 1995, Hetherington & Nelson 2003, Entman 2004).  
 
A plausible reason why most studies on the phenomenon have taken place in the 
United States is that the specifications of the theory fit particularly well in its 
presidential system. Power is namely highly centered on one individual: the president. 
Contrary to leaders in other political systems, the directly elected incumbent in the 
United States is both head of state and head of government. In presidential systems, 
executive power is therefore highly centered on the president and the ministers in his 
government are advisers to the president rather than coequal participants with a clear 
portfolio for which they are personally responsible (Lijphart 1999, 105). Presidents of 
the United States are mandated to make important decisions with or without this 
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advice from his ministers, while major decision-making processes in other systems 
rather is a joint task of members of government (Lijphart 1999, 118).  
 
The effect of systemic differences on the ability of voters to assign responsibility to 
political institutions is widely acknowledged in scholarly literature (Whitten and 
Palmer 1999; Nadeau 2002; Hellwig and Samuels 2008). The ability of the electorate 
to express evaluations of the incumbent is determined by the question whether voters 
can differentiate between political actors. As the responsibility to govern in 
presidential systems, such as the United States, is clearly appointed to the president, 
rally-effects are most likely to be reflected solely in his approval ratings. In 
parliamentary systems the clarity of responsibility issue is more complex as the 
institutional design allows multiple political institutions to be in the limelight than in 
presidential systems. Contrary to presidential systems, voters are therefore more 
likely to hold more than one political actor, besides the Prime Minister, responsible in 
times of international crises.  
 
As a marginal part of the studies on the rally-effect has been conducted in other cases 
than the United States, little is known about the workings of the phenomenon in other 
political systems. The strong focus of the existing literature on the United States 
makes it hard to determine whether the American political system and the political 
status of the United States in the international system or the institutional environment 
that gives rally-effects the opportunity to arise and accelerate relatively quickly. This 
issue requests for more focus on the workings of the rally-effect in parliamentary 
systems.  
 
Chawonietz (2011) is one of the few scholars who have initiated observations on the 
effect in four parliamentary European countries. He investigated how terrorist attacks 
in four European countries, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Spain, caused 
members of opposition to behave differently in relation to the incumbent. Through 
executing a content analysis of media attention on terrorist acts, he found that rally-
effects in these countries were stronger when the magnitude of the event was more 
substantial and national symbols were targeted (2011, 12). Chawonietz’s study draws 
these conclusions by observing whether opposition parties became able to 
compromise with the government in these countries and measures potential rally-
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effects by analyzing media reports on the event. Both the angle and the methodology 
used in the study, however, limit Chawonanietz (2011) to draw any conclusions on 
how the media attention on the crises to which these countries have been exposed 
have affected the electorate’s evaluations on the incumbent.  
 
Despite the fact that the literature on the phenomenon outside the United States is 
small, most studies on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect in other systems have been 
done in the United Kingdom. It makes sense to refer to the findings from studies in 
the United Kingdom when one wants to study the phenomenon in the Netherlands, as 
their political systems of these countries show more resemblance than with the United 
States. The Falkland War, a territorial dispute with Argentina, has drawn the interest 
of scholars to investigate the workings of the phenomenon in the United Kingdom. 
Norpoth (1987 a/b), for example, concluded that this war earned Thatcher, as well as 
the Conservative Party, with a substantial increase in support, which was also found 
to decay slowly after a certain period of time. In contrast to Norpoth, Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh (1987) found that economic factors were rather at the root of the surge in 
Thatcher’s approval ratings than the Falkland Wars, as the Conservatives were 
already on the upswing at the time the Falkland War broke out.  
 
When examining the literature executed in the United Kingdom, it becomes clear that 
the parliamentary political system has encouraged scholars to focus on multiple 
indicators when measuring a rally-effect. Morgan and Anderson (1999) make claims 
on the occurrence of rally-effects in the United Kingdom by comparing records of 
government approval and support for government parties in times of international 
crises in the forty years after World War 2. They acknowledge that institutional 
environment of the United Kingdom, a parliamentary system, blurs the clarity of 
responsibility in times of crises, as Britain has a tradition of government by cabinet 
rather than government by the president (1999, 811). Decision makers in 
parliamentary systems are collectively accountable, which scatters the effect of the 
rally in times of a crisis over more than one executive. 
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Expectations: dependent variable – scattered responsibility 
As the Netherlands is a parliamentary system as well and the executive power is 
diffused over more than one institution, it is expected that rally-events in the 
Netherlands has a more diffused effect over multiple executive institutions than in 
presidential systems. The differences in the clarity of responsibility between 
presidential and parliamentary systems, briefly summarized before, show the 
discrepancy in the clarity of responsibility and advocates for a broader focus when 
investigating rally-effects in parliamentary systems. According to Bronski and Way 
(2003) there are three relevant institutions to look at when examining rally-effects in 
parliamentary systems. Due to the scattered clarity of responsibility in these systems, 
it makes sense to investigate approval ratings of Prime Minister, the government and 
electoral support for ruling party or parties (2003, 13).  
 
Although the distribution of power in parliamentary systems is found to be dispersed 
over more than one institution, other scholars have found that the role of the Prime 
Minister in parliamentary systems has become “presidentialized”. By studying this 
phenomenon in the United Kingdom Lanoue and Headrick (1994) found that party 
support has increasingly been driven by the popularity of the Prime Minister. This 
development is considered to presidentialize the role of the country’s leader. Scholars 
that have studied the personalization of politics in the Netherlands, however, are more 
reluctant to draw the same conclusion (Poguntke & Webb 2005) or even deny that 
personalization has been a trend over the past years but conclude that leaders are 
subordinated to the party (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg 2008). The alleged 
presidentialization that has been found in other parliamentary systems is therefore not 
assumed to have increased in the Netherlands over the past years. Following that 
logic, rally-effects in the Netherlands, in contrary to presidential systems, are likely to 
be reflected in approval of the government. In other words: 
 
H1: Rally events in the Netherlands do not only have an impact on the approval 
ratings of the Prime Minister, but also on general approval ratings of the government. 
 
Besides the alleged presidentialization of politics in the United Kingdom, Bronski and 
Way address another potential issue with measuring potential point of thought about 
rally-effects through analyzing fluctuations in party support in parliamentary systems 
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(2003: 14-5). Voting intentions that are used to assess party support, namely, address 
ideology more than support for the government. Although they acknowledge that 
voting intention and government support are related, Bronski and Way state that there 
is a difference in being satisfied with the incumbent and the willingness to actually 
vote for them in the next elections (2003, 14). Having a preference for a certain party, 
operating in government or in the opposition, says little about the degree to which 
voters approve or disapprove actions of the incumbent. Therefore the scholars do not 
consider support for the governing parties to be a valid indicator to measure a rally 
effect. 
 
This does not mean it is irrelevant to observe fluctuations in party support to measure 
rally-effects in the Netherlands. Although the political systems show resemblance, the 
party systems of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom differ. While the United 
Kingdom, traditionally, has a two-party system, multiple parties are seated in the 
Dutch Parliament. This means that two parties represent two ideological blocks. 
Voters in the United Kingdom affiliate with one ideology and are not likely to switch 
from one to another. In the Dutch multiparty system multiple parties are part of an 
ideological block. The threshold for voters to switch their party preference within an 
ideological block is lower than in a two-party system and, therefore, encouraging 
Dutch voters to regularly do so (Mair 2008). It can be stated that voters in the 
Netherlands are more likely to switch their preference from an opposition to a 
coalition party than in the United Kingdom. The plurality of the Dutch party system 
along with an increasingly volatile Dutch electorate could make voters who did not 
support the party of the incumbent feel more affiliated by one of the parties in 
government as a consequence of a rally event. Therefore, the third hypothesis will be 
the following: 
 
H2: Rally-events in the Netherlands are likely to have an impact on support for both 
governing and opposition parties. 
 
Although the role of the party is found to be more prominent than the role of the 
leader of the party (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg 2008), it remains undisputed that the 
actions of the Prime Minister affect support for his party. Contrary to what has been 
found in precedent studies in the United Kingdom, Clarke (et al. 2000) concluded that 
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actions of the Prime Minister are likely to affect support for the specific party in 
government. Logically, the impact of Prime Ministers on party support varies from 
one to the next (Clarke et al. 2000, 269). The same can be expected from the Dutch 
Prime Minister as he or she is chairman of the Council of Ministers and is first 
representative of the Netherlands internationally
4
. As being the ‘first among other 
ministers’, the Prime Minister is likely to make a statement on behalf of the 
government after a rally-event takes place. Therefore, support for the party of the 
Prime Minister is more likely to change than support for the other party or parties in 
government:  
 
H3: Rally-events are likely to have a greater impact on the support for the party of 
the Prime Minister than the support for other governing parties. 
 
Expectations: independent variables – pre-event approval/support 
In studies, mostly conducted in the United States, pre-crisis popularity is found to 
have an impact on the magnitude of the rally-effect  (Kernell 1978; Lian and Oneal 
1993; Baker and Oneal 2001; Bronski and Way 2003). Of course, a core of strong 
partisan supporters of the opposition will always be dissatisfied with the way things 
are going in the particular country and blaming the incumbent for this perceived 
misery. This partisan electorate who unconditionally supports the party that is not in 
office is, therefore, unlikely to adjust its evaluations of the incumbent. Besides this 
relatively small group of radical partisan voters, the majority of voters is sensitive to 
positive images of the incumbent created by events involving the country. In times of 
crises, popular incumbents find it rather difficult to benefit from it, as his electoral 
potential is already at a high level before the particular event. Unpopular presidents, 
however, (re)gain relatively easy in approval from rally-events. Increases in party 
support could mostly be explained by the swing of voters who formally supported the 
president but disagreed with his policy in office or the attraction of uncommitted 
swing voters. The same will be expected for all three political institutions observed in 
this study: 
 
                                                        
4 Core tasks of the Prime Minister in the Netherlands according to the official website of the Dutch 
government: (1) Chairman of the Council of Minister, (2) Minister of General Affairs, (3) responsible for the 
actions of members of the Royal family, (4) representative of the Netherlands internationally.  
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/az/organisatie/organogram/minister-president 
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H4: Unpopular Prime Ministers, governments or governing parties are more likely to 
benefit from rally-events than popular ones. 
 
Expectations: independent variables – type of event 
Bronski and Way’s study shows that rallies are clearly apparent throughout history in 
the United Kingdom - a parliamentary system - but work differently than in the 
United States - a presidential system. The magnitude of rallies is found to be highly 
variable and context-dependent (2003, 33). Shortly after that, Lai and Reiter (2005) 
concluded that public opinion in the United Kingdom is more inclined to rally when 
the international crisis poses a direct threat to the national interests, such as the 
Falkland war and the Gulf Wars.  
 
Studies on the “rally-’round-the-flag”-effect in major powers thus focus solely on the 
effect of military disputes on the public opinion of the country involved. Bronski and 
Way analyze what effect military disputes throughout the postwar history of the 
United Kingdom on the public, by using all events from the Military Interstate 
Disputes (MID’s)-data set (2003, 12). However, the size and status of the Netherlands 
in the international system are relatively limited and therefore Dutch international, 
military initiatives are usually executed in a multilateral set-up, mostly coordinated by 
the United Nations or NATO
5
. Logically, some of the Dutch interventions – with a 
lower level of hostility, such as peacekeeping efforts in instable regions in the 
Balkans, Africa and the Middle East - have been less threatening to the Netherlands 
than those with a higher level of hostility, such as the efforts in Afghanistan to expel 
the Taliban. When examining the workings of the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect in the 
Netherlands, these relatively threatening events are the only military events to focus 
on.  
 
The specifications of the plane crash of flight MH-17 in Ukraine, on the other hand, 
gives reason to believe that non-military events are also, or even more, likely to rally 
the Dutch public and thus can be considered to be as rally-events. According to 
Mueller, a rally-event can be recognized by the international scope of the crisis (1), by 
the involvement of the country’s executive (2) and by its specific, dramatic and 
                                                        
5 idem 
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sharply focused nature of the event (3) (Mueller 1970, 20). The involvement of 
multiple states shows the international scope of the crisis. The plane has crashed in 
the Ukraine, Russia is accused of having provided pro-Russian Ukrainians with the 
rocket system with which the plane is assumed to be taken down and a large share of 
the passengers on the plane, of which none survived, were Dutch. Moreover, the 
prominent role of multiple members of the Dutch government in the aftermath of the 
crisis shows the involvement of the country’s leaders in the crisis. Third, the number 
of Dutch victims in the crash illustrates the tragedy of the crisis. Finally, as discussed 
earlier, media and opposition parties have come to recently criticize the actions of the 
government before, during and after the crisis. The extent to which this non-military 
event fits Mueller’s definition of a rally-event provides gives reason to expect that 
non-military events have rallied the Dutch public more than the limited number of 
military events the Netherlands have experienced over the past fifteen years. In other 
words: 
 
H5: Non-military events in which the Netherlands are involved are more likely to 
rally the Dutch public than military events.  
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Method 
Operationalization of the independent variable 
Bronski and Way (2003) use the MID-data set in which all military disputes initiated 
by the United Kingdom between 1950 and 2001 are outlined and provided with 
contextual figures per event. Ideally, a comparable approach would be used in this 
study, but the absence of such data sets of military activities together with the absence 
of necessary polling data at the time of the crises make a replication of this approach 
impossible. Since polling data on the three specific indicators are available from 2000 
and onward, this study makes focuses on rally-events since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.  
 
As discussed earlier, it is debatable whether a focus on military events initiated by the 
Netherlands, comparable to the approach of Bronski and Way (2003), would provide 
useful lessons about the workings of the “rally-round-the-flag”-effect in the 
Netherlands. The relatively small size and status in the international system has 
encouraged the Netherlands to selectively undertake military action in cooperation 
with other states under the flag of NATO or the United Nations. Mostly, armed forces 
have been employed for humanitarian reasons, which are not assumed to have 
provoked any sentiments in the public opinion that could make it rally around its 
leader. Therefore only specific events prior to and during three military missions 
abroad with a relatively high level of hostility – ISAF in Afghanistan, MINUSMA in 
Mali and the participation in the coalition of the willing to strike ISIS in Iraq - that 
took place in the past fifteen years have been included in this study.  
 
Besides the few military events that might have rallied the Dutch public around the 
incumbent, this study focuses on non-military events as well. Unfortunately, a 
database of crises in which the Netherlands have been involved in, such as the MID-
data set for military disputes in the United Kingdom, that could be used to select 
rally-events for this study has not (yet) been compiled. In absence of such a 
compilation, the first step was to compile a number of crises that could have caused 
for the public to rally. Scholars who focused on the phenomenon, like Chawonietz 
(2011), use the amount of media attention on a particular event to define the size of 
the rally-event. The more attention a particular crisis has drawn in national media, the 
more likely the crisis could be considered as a rally-event. To select particular non-
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military crises that have the potential to rally the Dutch public opinion, a simple 
content analysis is executed. By counting the number of articles in national media that 
have paid attention to the particular crisis events, it is possible to identify potential 
rally-events.  
 
LexisNexis, the academic search engine widely used for content analyses, is used to 
measure the number of articles in national media for a particular crisis. First, a pre-
selection of non-military crises is made on the basis of the output of articles in 
national media between the start of the twenty-first century until now after searching 
on general terms that refer to crises, attacks, assaults or disasters
6
. To make sure the 
events referred to the articles are appropriate potential rally-events, they are filtered 
on the basis of the Mueller’s characteristics of a rally-event (1970). Subsequently, the 
number of articles per event is counted by searching on one or a combination of two 
terms that are characteristic for the particular event. For example, to expose the media 
attention shortly after the crash of flight MH17, a combination of the terms “MH17” 
and “vliegramp”7 is used to expose the number of national newspaper articles that 
covered the event from the 17
th
 of July – the day the plane crashed – and a week after 
that. A total of thirteen potential, non-military rally-events have been identified using 
this logic. 
 
On the basis of the selection criteria above, a total number of twenty-one potential 
rally-events have been identified and are presented in table 1. The table also provides 
information, such as the date, the number of articles in the media shortly after the 
event and the degree to which the events meet with the characteristics of a rally-event 
constructed by Mueller (1970). As is presented in the table, some non-military events 
are not particularly international – one of the characteristics of a rally-event according 
to Mueller (1970). However, looking at Mueller’s justification of this criterion raises 
doubts on whether it should apply on every rally-event. He argues that “it (i.e. a rally-
event) must be international because only developments confronting the nation as a 
whole are likely to generate a “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect. Major domestic events-
riots, scandals, strikes- are at least as likely to exacerbate internal divisions as they are 
to soothe them” (Mueller 1970, 21). Some of the crises, such as the explosion in a 
                                                        
6 Terms searched on, in Dutch: “ramp”, “crisis”, “aanslag”, “aanval”, “tragedie”.  
7 Dutch translation of “crash” 
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fireworks storage causing 23 deaths and about 950 people wounded, are as unlikely to 
have exacerbated societal divisions as international events such as the crash of MH17. 
This applies to multiple domestic events in recent Dutch history, which make them 
worthwhile to investigate in this study.   
 
 
 
While observing potential rally-events over the past fifteen years, contextual 
phenomenon could bias the effect. The most prominent ones are the ‘halo’ and the 
‘honeymoon’-effect. During the first few months after the inauguration of a new 
cabinet, the electorate is likely to have high hopes following from the promises and 
prospects made by the winning parties prior to the election (Kernell 1978). During 
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such a period, the incumbent generally experiences relatively high levels of approval. 
A rally-event that takes place during such a period is unlikely to improve approval 
ratings of the incumbent even more (Bronski and Way 2003). It will, however, not be 
possible to test this assumption as no rally-events have taken place during such 
periods over the past fifteen years.   
 
Operationalization of the dependent variable 
To investigate whether rally-effects have occurred in the Netherlands over the past 
fifteen years, this study analyzes job approval ratings of the Prime Minister, 
government and support for the parties in office when the above-mentioned events 
took place. Obviously, the most ideal way to measure the emergence and the 
magnitude of a rally effect is by monitoring day-to-day changes in the public opinion. 
As it is impossible for polling agencies to execute surveys in such a frequency, this 
study will use available monthly data on party support and the popularity of leaders 
before and after the particular event.  
 
In the Netherlands, Ipsos frequently measures party support by surveying a 
representative sample of the country’s electorate from its own panel8 and asks voters 
to evaluate political institutions such as party support, job approval of the Prime 
Minister and the government. Ipsos measures the approval of the Prime Minister’s 
together with all other ministers in the cabinet. To acquire proper and useful 
evaluations, respondents are asked to indicate which of the ministers in government 
they know beforehand. The question “if you had to evaluate the following ministers 
on a scale from 1, which is very bad, to 10, which is excellent, what grade would you 
give them for their current performance“ presented if respondents know the particular 
ministers
9
. The public’s approval of the current government is measured by asking the 
question: “On a scale from 1, which very bad, and 10, which is excellent, what grade 
would you give for its current performance”. Finally, Ipsos measures party support by 
means of asking respondents: “If parliamentary elections would be held today, what 
                                                        
8 Ipsos Netherlands surveys approximately 1.000 respondents, of which the results are weighted on socio-
demographic characteristics to the Dutch population of 18 years and older. Ipsos Netherlands invites 
respondents to participate in an online survey. The respondents are pooled out of their own market 
research panel, for which respondents can register to participate in all sorts of studies.   
9 Translated from Dutch to English. Original question in Dutch: “Als u de onderstaande ministers met een 
rapportcijfer zou moeten beoordelen waarbij 1 zeer slecht is en 10 uitmuntend is, welk cijfer zou u dan 
geven?”  
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party would you vote for?” In this study, the focus will solely be on fluctuations in 
support for the governing parties.  
 
To calculate whether rally-effects have occurred, this study compares approval ratings 
and party support before and after a particular event. To measure effect of the rally-
events on the indicators used in this study, the last poll conducted before each event 
will be subtracted from the first poll conducted after event took place (Bronski & 
Way 2003, 15). The changes of the indicators show the particular effect. In 
accordance with the order of the five hypotheses stated earlier, the changes in the 
indicators will be presented and compared in tables and graphs. To be able to make 
claims about the strength of the effects on the indicators, the changes in approval and 
support will be tested by means of an independent sample t-test. These tables should 
indicate whether some of the expectations can be confirmed.  
 
Besides the initial analysis of the available polling data, a linear regression model will 
be executed, in which it is investigated whether the type of event – non-military or 
military – explains variations in rally-effects. The first goal of performing such an 
analysis is to see if it is possible to make claims on whether the Prime Minister, the 
government as a whole or the party benefits more than the other from different types 
of events, and if so, which of those institutions benefits most from a particular event. 
The regression test also provides the opportunity to measure whether pre-crisis level 
of approval and party support has an effect on each of the indicators. By including the 
pre-crisis levels of approval and support, it should be possible to determine whether 
relatively unpopular entities actually do benefit more from rally-events than relatively 
popular ones.  
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Descriptive analysis of changes in approval and support 
This section presents a first descriptive analysis of rally-effects of the military and 
non-military events since the beginning of the twenty-first century outlined above. 
This section will first present and interpret the results on approval ratings of the 
government and the Prime Minister and subsequently look at changes in support for 
the governing and opposition parties at times of crises. At the end of this first section 
it is possible to make statements about the effect of rally-events on the three 
indicators, but also expose whether military or non-military events have influenced 
the Dutch public opinion the most.  
 
Government approval 
Table 2 reports the effect of the rally-events on government approval in the 
Netherlands from 2000 until now, first for all rally-events and subsequently for each 
government. Of the non-military rally-events that took place during the first three 
governments led by CDA-Prime-Minister Balkenende have only had little effect on 
evaluations of the Dutch public concerning the government. Only during the last 
government led by Balkenende, government approval ratings have increased – with 
0,4 on a scale from one to ten - after the fatal crash of a Afriqayah Airways-plane 
with numerous Dutch citizens on board. Another substantial rally-effect appeared 
after the crash of MH17, as approval for the government improved with 0,6 while 
Rutte led his second government. Only one military rally-event – the parliamentary 
approval of the Dutch participation in MINUSMA – have changed government 
approval ratings significantly (+0,3).       
 
The variance in the number of rally-events during each government is also quite large. 
The fourth, and last, government led by Balkenende experienced the most rally-events 
(8) while the previous government, also led by Balkenende, experienced none. 
Logically, the number of rally-events per government is heavily dependent on the 
period the particular government is in office. The number of rally-events per 
government, however, does not necessarily determine the strength of the rally-effect 
per government. For example, while Balkenende IV was in office the Netherlands 
suffered from eight rally-events, alternating the government approval rating with 
+0,06 on average. The mean of rally-effects during Rutte II, however, is substantially 
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higher (+0,24) than during Balkenende IV, despite the fact that the Netherlands 
suffered from less rally-events while Rutte II is in office (4).  
 
Approval of the Prime Minister 
Table 2 also reports the changes in approval of the Prime Minister due to rally-events 
that took place over the past fifteen years. In comparison with the changes in 
government approval ratings, rally-events appear to have affected approval of the 
Prime Minister quite often. Of the non-military events, significant rally-effects have 
occurred following from the fireworks explosion in Enschede (+0,4), the 
nationalization of ABN AMRO/FORTIS (+0,4), the attack on the Dutch royal family 
(+0,4), the earthquake in Haiti (+0,4), the crash of a Afriqayah Airways-airplane 
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(+0,4), the shootings in Alphen aan de Rijn (+0,4) and the crash of flight MH17 (+1). 
Other events have caused for only limited change in approval ratings for the Prime 
Minister.  
 
Of the Prime Ministers in office over the past fifteen years, approval ratings of Rutte 
have improved the most from rally-events. On average, his approval ratings in times 
of rally-events during his last two terms improved with 0,5 on a scale of one to ten. 
On the other hand, change in approval ratings of Balkenende after rally-events during 
his terms in office has been limited (+0,08). Finally, approval ratings of Kok 
improved with 0,09 on a scale from one to ten.  
 
In addition, three out of six military rally-events have caused for a significant impact 
on the Prime Minister’s approval rating: the first attack initiated by the United States 
to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq (+0,5), the decision of the Dutch 
government to intensify the military efforts in Uruzgan/Afghanistan (+0,3) and the 
decision of Dutch parliament to participate in the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq (+0,3). 
Focusing on the different governments, none of them have benefited more from 
military events over the past fifteen years than others. 
 
Difference approval ratings for types of events 
When comparing the mean changes in government approval due to non-military and 
non-military events, it shows that the mean change in government approval due to 
non-military events (+0,13) is higher than the mean change for government approval 
due to military events (+0,09). This is less applicable to the mean change in approval 
of the Prime Minister. Although approval ratings of the Prime Minister increased 
more due to non-military events (+0,18) than due to military events (+0,14), both 
means have improved insignificantly. Although some individual events have caused 
for significant rally-effects, the average change in approval ratings due to non-
military events is only indicative.  
 
Of the non-military events only three events have increased approval ratings of the 
government: the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001, the crash of 
Afriqayah Airways above Tripoli and the crash of flight MH17 above Ukraine. The 
crashed planes of the Afriqayah Airways and Malaysia Airlines had numerous Dutch 
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people on board, of which almost all lost their lives. The dramatic fate of the Dutch 
citizens on board of these airplanes is likely to be a prominent explanatory factor for 
the quite substantial rally-effects. The increase in government approval ratings due to 
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, however, is remarkable, as the 
Netherlands were not directly involved in this particular event. Only one out of six 
military rally-events – the approval of the Dutch parliament to participate in 
MINUSMA in Mali - has had a significant effect on government approval ratings.  
 
 
 
However, whereas two of the four rally-events have increased government approval, 
they did not have an effect on approval of the Prime Minister. The terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Centre in New York as well as the decision of Dutch parliament to 
participate in MINUSMA did not alter approval ratings of the Prime Minister. Both 
plane crashes that had a significant effect on government approval ratings, on the 
other hand, have had a similar effect on the approval ratings of the Prime Minister. 
This congruence in the impact of these events strengthens the assumption that these 
events have actually rallied the Dutch public. Again, however, the mean changes due 
to both military and non-military events did not change significantly. To illustrate the 
differences in magnitude of military and non-military events on government approval 
and approval of the Prime Minister over the past fifteen years, the mean changes are 
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presented in figure 1. Despite the number of rally-events that have caused for 
significant changes in approval ratings, the mean changes indicate that non-military 
events, on average, hardly have a greater impact on both approval ratings than 
military events.  
 
Party support: government vs. opposition 
The third and last indicator that is expected to be affected by rally-events is support 
for parties in Parliament. Scholars investigating the magnitude of the phenomenon in 
other cases have mainly focused on fluctuations in support for the incumbent. As for 
the governing and opposition parties, changes in party support are likely to be a zero-
sum game. Governing parties gain support when the opposition parties lose in support 
and vice versa. This makes it relevant to look at changes in support for both 
governing and opposition parties when measuring the effect of rally-events.   
 
Table 3 presents changes in support for the governing and biggest opposition parties 
due to the rally-events since 2000. Looking at the changes in party support for the 
governing parties, it shows that the most substantive mutations have occurred due to 
the murder on Fortuyn and the crash of MH17. In times of the former, governing 
parties have suffered quite dramatically (-11 seats) while the biggest opposition 
parties in parliament, on the other hand, gained 8 seats in support. Contextual factors, 
however, demonstrate that the dramatic changes in party support are unlikely to be 
caused by the murder of Fortuyn. First of all, the event took place in the run-up to the, 
already sensational, General Elections of 2002. A variety of events could have 
affected party preferences of voters in this crucial phase of the campaign, alternating 
the stakes in the polls. In addition, Kok II operated as a caretaker government at the 
time Fortuyn was assassinated. The discrepancy between the effect on approval 
ratings of the government and the Prime Minister, presented earlier in this study, raise 
serious doubts on whether the Dutch public rallied after the murder of Fortuyn as 
well. Clearly the Dutch electorate had reason to change party preferences, but not 
change its evaluation of the caretaking government and Prime Minister at that time
10
.  
 
                                                        
10 On a scale from 1 to 10, government approval changed with 0,12 and approval of Prime Minister Kok 
altered with -0,13. Both changes have been insignificant. 
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To a lesser extent, the same can be assumed on the helicopter crash in Mali, in which 
two Dutch soldiers lost their lives. Approval ratings of the Prime Minister and the 
government hardly changed, whereas support increased for the governing parties (+6 
seats) and support for the opposition parties slightly diminished (-2). The changes in 
party support are more likely to be derived by events in relation to the Provincial 
Elections that took place the day after the crash took place than by the rally-event 
itself. Comparing the effects on all three indicators, therewith, turns out to be a useful 
way to interpret and appreciate changes after the events took place.  
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Because the General Elections of 2002 and the Provincial Elections of 2015 are likely 
to have affected party support more than the rally-events that took place prior to these 
elections, table 3 presents two types of mean changes in party support due to military 
and non-military events: one in which the mutations of the two events are included 
and one in which these are excluded. Focusing on the mean changes in support due to 
non-military events, it shows that governing parties, on average, benefit slightly more 
in support (+0,41 seats) without the murder on Fortuyn. On the other hand, opposition 
parties lose (-1,42 seats) more when the murder on Fortuyn is excluded from the 
compilation. When the crash of the military helicopter in Mali is excluded from the 
calculation, the mean changes in party support due to military events indicate a 
smaller impact of these events on party preferences. 
 
Difference party support for types of events 
Focusing on the rally-effects per event, it shows that recent events, taking place 
during one of the governments led by Rutte, have had a stronger effect on party 
support than events that took place during prior governments. These include the crash 
of MH17 (non-military event), but also for the Dutch participation in the joint anti-
ISIS mission in Iraq (military event)
11
. Figure 2 clearly illustrates the degree of rally-
effects for both non-military and military events. The difference in mean changes 
between military and non-military events for the governing parties turns out not to 
vary much. Both military and non-military events have improved support for the 
governing parties only slightly. On the other hand, the average support for the bigger 
opposition parties diminished somewhat more due to non-military events than due to 
military events. This only applies, of course, when the dramatic changes in support 
after the murder of Fortuyn and after the crash of the helicopter in Mali are excluded 
from the compilation. This loss in support for the opposition parties, however, should 
be considered as indicative taken the size of the scale – 1 to 150 seats in parliament - 
into account.  
 
                                                        
11 Party support also mutated at the time of the crash of the helicopter in Mali, but, as discussed earlier, 
these changes after the event are more likely to be explained by the campaign events prior to the Provincial 
Elections that took place shortly after the event. 
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Party of the Prime Minister 
From the data in table 4, it is also possible to see whether the prominent position of 
the Prime Minister in his government has an influence on the changes in party 
support. In other words, does the party of Prime Minister profit more from rally-
events than other governing parties? Despite the fact that the Dutch Prime Minister is 
theoretically equal amongst other ministers, he or she is formally the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers and the first representative of the Netherlands internationally
12
. 
After a rally-event, the Prime Minister is, therefore, likely to make an initial 
statement. Of the parties in government, the party of the Prime Minister is most likely 
to be affected more by a rally-event than the other party or parties in government.   
 
First of all, table 4 shows that there is some variance in the magnitude of the change 
in support for the party of the Prime Minister compared to the other governing parties. 
Gaps between the changes for the governing parties are demonstrated for to the 
murder of Fortuyn, the crash of a plane of Turkish Airlines, the crash of a plane of 
Afriqayah Airways, the crash of flight MH17 and the crash of the military helicopter 
                                                        
12 Core tasks of the Prime Minister in the Netherlands according to the official website of the Dutch 
government: (1) Chairman of the Council of Minister, (2) Minister of General Affairs, (3) responsible for the 
actions of members of the Royal family, (4) representative of the Netherlands internationally.  
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/az/organisatie/organogram/minister-president 
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in Mali. As is stated in the previous section, however, the presented possible changes 
in party support due to the murder of Fortuyn and the crash of the military helicopter 
in Mali should be called into question because of other contextual factors that are 
more likely to cause for changes in party support.  
 
The other, remarkably all crashes of passenger flights in which Dutch citizens have 
been injured or in which they have lost their lives
13
, show to have caused for some 
incongruence in growth of support for the governing parties. After the crash of a 
Turkish Airlines-plane near Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam the party of Prime 
Minister Balkenende, the CDA, gained three seats while the other governing parties 
remained unaffected (PvdA: -1, CU: 0). During the same term, the CDA lost four 
seats after the crash of the Afriqayah Airways-plane. Contrary to the party of the 
Prime Minister, the other governing parties again remained unaffected (both PvdA 
and CU: 0). The results for this airplane crash thus indicate to have diminished 
support from the party of the Prime Minister. In contrast, the crash of flight MH17, 
taking place during the second government led by Rutte, seems to have benefited the 
party of the Prime Minister most. The VVD gained four seats, while the other 
governing parties did not manage to take advantage of the crisis.  
 
In table 4 the mean changes in support for each governing party due to rally-events 
have been calculated. As discussed, the effect of two events on party support is 
considered as debatable, which means that the changes after these events can be 
excluded from the calculation. Focusing on these calculations for military and non-
military events, it can be concluded that, over the past fifteen years, rally-events have 
hardly affected the party of the Prime Ministers more than the other governing parties. 
The average change in support for the Prime Minister due to non-military events is -
0,08 of the 150 seats in parliament, while the second and third party respectively 
changed with +0,33 and +0.18 on average. Moreover military events have changed 
                                                        
13 Crash MH17: 196 Dutch citizens lost their lives 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/30/bergingsmissie-mh17-afgerond-na-finale-laatste-slag/ 
Crash Afriqayah airways: 70 Dutch citizens lost their lives 
http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/monument-vliegramp-tripoli-nieuwegein 
Crash Turkish Airlines: took place on Dutch soil, three American passengers, and Boeing employees, lost 
their lives, unknown number of passengers injured 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110915124844/http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2009/q1/09022
7d_nr.html 
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the party of the Prime Minister with -0,29 on average, while support for the other 
governing parties changed with 0,43 and 0,2 on average.  
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Pre-crisis popularity  
In scholarly literature on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect it was found that 
unpopular presidents in the United States benefited more from rally-events than 
relatively popular presidents (Kernell 1978; Lian and Oneal 1993; Baker and Oneal 
2001; Bronski and Way 2003). To measure the applicability of this finding in the 
Netherlands over the past fifteen years, the pre-crisis levels of approval and support 
have been distinguished in three categories: low, medium and high. The categories 
have been constructed by means of the distribution of the pre-crisis levels of approval 
and support. Consequently, the mean changes per category are calculated.  
 
Table 5 reports the mean changes due to rally-events per pre-crisis level of approval 
or support for each indicator. Whereas the mean changes for approval of the Prime 
Minister and the government do not vary, the mean changes in support for the 
governing parties indicates a pattern as expected from what scholars have found. 
Governing parties that are relatively popularity on average do not benefit from rally-
events. On the other hand, relatively unpopular governing parties, on average, win 
slightly from rally-events. The mean changes, however, are not significant and should 
therefore be considered as indicative. 
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Regression analysis 
Type of event and pre-crisis popularity 
So far, this study has presented how each of the events has affected approval ratings 
and support for governing institutions. The proportionally high number of significant 
changes per event indicates that non-military events have rallied the Dutch public to a 
greater degree than for military events. On the other hand the mean changes due to 
military and non-military events do not present a significant difference between pre- 
and post-crisis levels of approval and support. A linear regression test will be 
executed hereafter to determine to what degree the changes in approval and support 
can be explained by the type of rally-event. Moreover, the regression test will decide 
whether the pre-crisis level of approval or support has an effect on the change in 
approval or support due to rally-events.  
 
Table 6 reports the outcome of the linear regression for all rally-events except for the 
murder of Fortuyn and the crash of a Dutch military helicopter in Mali. As discussed 
in the previous section, the changes in approval and support that are reported after 
these events are likely to be stimulated by contextual factors other than these crises. 
With these events excluded from the model a total of nineteen events are regressed, 
distinguishing twelve non-military and seven military events. In the regression model 
the non-military events are labeled with 1, whereas military events have been labeled 
as 0.  
 
Starting with the results for the approval of the Prime Minister, it shows that a low 
share of the total variation can be explained by the type of event (non-military versus 
military). The R square value reported in the table implies that the type of event is 
accountable for approximately 8 per cent of the variation in approval ratings of the 
Prime Minister. The table also shows the value of the intercept and the regression 
coefficient. The equation is, therewith, change in approval of the Prime Minister = 
1,190 + 0,087 * (type of rally-event). Considering that non-military events were 
labeled as 1 and military events as 0, the values in the equation imply that non-
military events have a slightly more positive impact on approval of the Prime Minister 
than military events. 
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On the other hand, the beta-value for the control variable shows to impact approval 
ratings of the Prime Minister negatively. The equation is as follows: change in 
approval of the Prime Minister = 1,990 + -0,186 * (pre-crisis level of approval). This 
indicates that approval ratings of the Prime Minister are less likely to improve when 
he or she is rather popular before a crisis takes place. However, both independent 
variables – type of event and the pre-crisis level of approval – do not affect approval 
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of the Prime Minister significantly
14
. The null-hypotheses for both relationships, 
therefore, can neither be confirmed nor rejected
15
. 
 
The R square value for the changes in government approval is somewhat higher than 
the value of the same test for the approval of the Prime Minister. 28 percent of the 
total variation in government approval ratings can be explained by the type of event. 
Although the independent variables explain more when it comes to variation in 
government approval, this outcome is still rather low. Following on with regression 
coefficients for government approval, the values show some resemblance with those 
of the approval of the Prime Minister. Again, non-military events have a slightly more 
positive effect on government approval ratings than military events
16
. However, the 
beta-values for government approval do not expose a significant relationship
17
, which 
means the null-hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor can it be rejected
18
. 
 
Besides that, the regression coefficient for the effect of the pre-crisis level of 
government approval display a high resemblance with what is found on approval of 
the Prime Minister. The higher the pre-crisis level of government approval, the less 
likely the particular government seems to benefit from a rally-event
19
. The 
significance test for pre-crisis government approval and change in government 
approval suggests a significant (negative) relationship between this independent and 
the dependent variable
20
. In other words, the null-hypothesis for this relationship can 
be rejected
21
.  
 
Moving on with the test results for the support in governing parties, the R square 
shows the independent variables to not explain very much – 27 percent – of the 
variation in support for the governing parties. This is comparable to the R square 
value for the change in government approval. The slope of the regression line for the 
type of event indicates a minor effect of this independent variable on change in 
                                                        
14 p-value for the type of event on change in approval of the Prime Minister: 0,591. p-value for the pre-crisis 
level of approval of the Prime Minister and the change in approval of the Prime Minister: 0,288. 
15 H0: The slope of the regression line of the independent variables is equal to zero. 
16 Equation: changes in government approval=0,991 + 0,058*(type of event)  
17 p: 0,941 
18 H0: The slope of the regression line of the independent variables is equal to zero. 
19 Equation: changes in government approval=0,991 + -0,164*(type of event) 
20 P: 0,026 
21 H0: The slope of the regression line of the independent variable is equal to zero. 
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support for the governing parties. On a scale of 1 to 150 seats in Dutch parliament, 
non-military events cause for a slightly larger growth in support (0,6 seats) than 
military events, which is statistically insignificant
22
. Herewith, the null-hypothesis for 
this relationship is to be confirmed
23
.  
 
Comparably to the beta-values for the other dependent variables, the pre-event level 
of support for the governing parties has a slight negative effect on support for the 
governing parties. The higher the pre-crisis level of support for the governing parties, 
the more the slope of the regression line for support for the governing parties 
decreases with 0,080 due to rally-events. Although this seems to be a minor impact, 
the p-value for this relationship indicates a statistical significant relationship between 
this independent and dependent variable
24
. Therewith, the null-hypothesis can be 
rejected
25
. 
 
Contrary to party support for the governing parties, support for the biggest opposition 
parties is expected to decrease after a rally-event occurs. The R square value 
implicates that the independent variables explain 37 percent of the variation in 
support for the opposition parties. This is somewhat higher than the values for the 
other dependent variables but still rather low in absolute sense. The beta-value for the 
type of event (-1,262) indicates that non-military events have a more negative effect 
on support for the opposition parties than military events. The significance test, 
however, indicates an absence of a statistical significance between this independent 
and support for the opposition parties
26
. Therewith, none of the dependent variables in 
the model seems to be explained by the type of event.   
 
On the other hand, the other independent variable – the pre-event level of support for 
the biggest opposition parties – affects the dependent variable significantly27. This 
would mean that the higher the pre-crisis level of party support for the bigger 
opposition parties, the more opposition parties suffer after a rally-event. The 
implications of this relationship for the applicability of the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-
                                                        
22 P: 0,552 
23 H0: The slope of the regression line of the independent variable is equal to zero. 
24 P: 0,027 
25 H0: The slope of the regression line of the independent variable is equal to zero. 
26 P: 0,25 
27 P: 0,09 
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effect in the Netherlands are, however, limited as the influence of this independent 
variable is only relevant for the variables concerning the government.  
 
Conclusion 
Does the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect fit particularly well in the United States due to 
its political system and culture? What happens if the phenomenon is transplanted to 
political systems other than the presidential American institutional design? Is there a 
way to exploit the phenomenon to a parliamentary system in which the clarity of 
responsibility is lower than in a presidential system? When going through the 
scholarly literature on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect, one would discover that the 
workings of the phenomenon have been tested mostly, if not solely, in the United 
States. With the sudden leap in president Bush’s approval ratings after 9/11 as 
paragon, studies on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect so far have presented 
spectacular examples of rally-events that have caused immediate changes in public 
opinion.  However, this ‘Americentrism’ of the scholarly debate limits the ability to 
gain insights on the workings of the phenomenon outside the United States.  
 
This study has been an attempt to break through this limited scope of the scholarly 
debate on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect so far. It has investigated whether the 
phenomenon can be applied to a parliamentary system, the Netherlands. The 
distribution of power in the Netherlands over the political institutions is less 
straightforward than the presidential system of the United States. The absence of a 
politically active head of state, the limited role of the Prime Minister, the extensive 
mandate of each minister in government and the prominence of parties in the 
Netherlands advocated for a wider scope of the dependent variable – the rally-effect. 
Three indicators have therefore been observed: approval of the Prime Minister, 
government approval and support for the governing and bigger opposition parties.  
 
Moreover, the size and status of the Netherlands have caused the country to be less 
militarily active than the United States. Whereas most studies on the rally-
phenomenon have solely considered military disputes as rally-events, this study has 
also introduced non-military crises as potential rally-events. A number of these events 
in the past fifteen years have drawn a relatively substantial amount of media attention. 
The crash of MH17 is a recent example of a non-military event with an extensive 
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societal impact. Besides eight military events, this study has included thirteen non-
military events to investigate.   
 
In the first section of this study on the applicability of the rally-effect in the 
Netherlands, the main goal was to expose whether rally-events in the past fifteen 
years have affected three indicators: government approval, approval of the Prime 
Minister and party support. To see whether rally-events have provoked sudden 
changes in public opinion, a descriptive analysis of polling data over the past fifteen 
years have been executed. Subsequently, a linear regression analysis has been 
executed to demonstrate whether changes in approval and support could be explained 
by the type of the rally-event (non-military versus military events). The pre-crisis 
levels of approval and support have been used as a control variable, to see whether it 
has been easier for unpopular Prime Ministers, governments or parties in government 
to benefit from rally-events.  
 
To determine and appreciate the impact of rally-events, it is necessary to focus on 
possible coherences between the changes of these three indicators that are caused by 
the rally-events. On the basis of these interpretations, it will be discussed hereafter 
what can be concluded with regard to the hypotheses outlined in the beginning of this 
study.  
 
H1: Rally events in the Netherlands do not only have an impact on the approval 
ratings of the Prime Minister, but also on general approval ratings of the government. 
 
The results for the change in government approval due to rally-events indicate that 
rally-events have had a moderate effect on evaluations of the Dutch public on the 
government. First of all, after four out of twenty-one rally-events significant changes 
in government approval ratings have occurred. Three of these were non-military 
events; one was a military event. The limited number of significant changes due to the 
twenty-one rally-events causes the average rally-effect on government approval to be 
minor. On a scale from one to ten, government approval ratings, on average, 
improved with 0,13 for non-military events and 0,09 for military events.  
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Following on with the changes in approval ratings of the Prime Minister, a number of 
rally-events have provoked the Dutch public to improve its opinion of the incumbent. 
Ten out of the twenty-one events have increased approval ratings of the Prime 
Minister significantly. This is relatively high compared to the number events that have 
caused for significant changes in government approval ratings. However, the mean 
changes for both non-military and military events are rather minor. On a scale from 
one to ten, the average grade due to non-military events improved with 0,18, whereas 
military events caused approval ratings for the Prime Minister to increase with 0,1.  
 
This leaves to conclude that although some of them have had a significant impact on 
the approval ratings, the average effect of rally-events on both indicators is limited. 
Comparing the number of events that have caused for a rally-effect, approval of the 
Prime Minister seems to be more sensitive rally-events than government approval. 
The absence of substantial mean changes implies, however, that insufficient empirical 
evidence can be to confirm the first hypothesis. On the basis of data for the past 
fifteen years, it can be stated that the Dutch public does not significantly alter its 
evaluations of the government and the Prime Minister.  
 
H2: Rally-events in the Netherlands are likely to have an impact on support for both 
governing and opposition parties. 
 
For testing the second hypothesis, this study has looked at mutations in both support 
for the governing and bigger opposition parties due to rally-events. The mean changes 
in party support due to non-military events demonstrate that governing parties, on 
average, benefit slightly more in support (+0,41 seats) without the murder on Fortuyn. 
On the other hand, opposition parties lose more (-1,42 seats) when the murder on 
Fortuyn is excluded from the compilation. When the crash of the military helicopter 
in Mali is excluded from the calculation, the mean changes in party support due to 
military events indicate a smaller impact of this type of events on party preferences. 
On a scale of 1 to 150 seats in Dutch parliament, the average impact of rally-events on 
party support can be considered as indicative, but not significant. This means that it 
cannot be stated with confidence that governing parties in the Netherlands benefit 
from rally-events.  
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H3: Rally-events are likely to have a greater impact on the support for the party of the 
Prime Minister than the support for other governing parties. 
 
Subsequently, this study hypothesized that rally-events could provoke Dutch voters to 
show their appreciation for the Prime Minister by supporting his party more than 
other governing parties. As the results for changes in support for governing and 
opposition parties turned out to be rather unspectacular, the changes for the individual 
governing parties are unsurprisingly minor as well. The average change in support for 
the Prime Minister due to non-military events is -0,08 of the 150 seats in parliament, 
while the second and third party respectively changed with +0,33 and +0.18 on 
average. Secondly, military events have changed the party of the Prime Minister with 
-0,29 on average, while support for the other governing parties changed with 0,43 and 
0,2 on average. Although some events have caused for some incongruence in effects 
on governing parties, the mean changes demonstrate that this is certainly no 
systematic reflex. On the basis of these results, the third hypothesis should be 
rejected.  
 
H4: Unpopular Prime Ministers, governments or governing parties are more likely to 
benefit from rally-events than popular ones. 
 
To test the fourth hypothesis, this study relied on two types of analysis: descriptive 
data analysis and a linear regression test. For the former, the pre-crisis levels of 
popularity for each indicator are categorized into low, medium and high on the basis 
of the distribution of pre-event levels of popularity for each event. For approval 
ratings for the government and the Prime Minister, no difference in rally-effects was 
discovered between the three pre-crisis levels of approval. A moderate pattern was 
revealed in the changes in support for the governing parties, but the incongruence in 
effects is small.  
 
The results for the regression analysis demonstrate the same for approval of the Prime 
Minister. Although high pre-crisis approval ratings have had some negative impact on 
the magnitude of the rally-effect, the results show to be insignificant. Although the 
regression coefficient does not vary much from the coefficient for approval of the 
Prime Minister, the pre-crisis popularity of the government appear to negatively 
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impact changes in government approval. The same can be concluded for party 
support. The slope of the regression line for governing parties develops moderately 
but statistically significant.  
 
The results for the descriptive and regression analysis are thus not very convincing. It 
appears pre-crisis popularity does not determine the magnitude of rally-effects when it 
comes to approval ratings of the Prime Minister. In other words, unpopular Prime 
Ministers did not benefit more from rally-events than popular ones. The results for 
government approval and party support call for a more restraint interpretation. Both 
an analysis of the data and a regression test demonstrate some (negative) impact of 
pre-crisis popularity, but the relationships appear, however, to be very moderate.  
 
Whether the fourth hypothesis applies in the Netherlands is, therefore, hard to decide.  
Although some of the expected patterns are discovered, the results are too fragile to 
make confident claims about the effects of pre-crisis popularity on rally-effects. A 
plausible reason for the indecisiveness of the analyses in this study seems the limited 
disposal of historical data on rally-events. To learn more from this relationship, this 
analysis should be expanded with more data of rally-events before the start of the 
twentieth century.   
 
H5: Non-military events in which the Netherlands are involved are more likely to 
rally the Dutch public than military events. 
 
Again, a descriptive analysis of existing data and a regression analysis were used to 
learn more on the effect of the type of event on approval ratings and party support. By 
averaging the changes per indicator for the two types of events, the magnitude of 
effects became visible. For approval ratings of the Prime Minister and the 
government, some variance in effects were apparent. Both indicators improved 
somewhat more due to non-military events (+0,18; +0,13) than due to military events 
(+0,1; +0,09). However, the change in means turned out to be insignificant. The same 
can be concluded from the regression analysis. None of the indicators presented 
significantly improving regression slopes, indicating that differences in rally-effects 
cannot be explained by the type of event. This means that non-military events are not 
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more likely to rally the Dutch public than military events and the fifth, and last, 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed.   
 
Implications  
The findings of this study indicate that the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect has been 
operating in some occasions. Ultimately, however, it must be concluded that this 
study has not found structural evidence in the data that alert to the applicability of the 
phenomenon in the Netherlands. In the context of the scholarly literature conducted 
mostly in the United States, the results conducted in this study demonstrate to be quite 
unspectacular. What does that tell us about reflexive tendency of the Dutch electorate 
after radical events take place? And what are the implications for the “rally-‘round-
the-flag”-phenomenon itself?  
 
The first plausible explanatory factor for these rather platonic results has to do with 
the systemic characteristics of the Dutch political system. Whereas public responses 
in presidential systems quite easily find their way to the president in office, the 
relatively complex institutional design of the Dutch parliamentary system is likely to 
diffuse reactions of the public to crises. As presented earlier, multiple scholars have 
addressed the low clarity of responsibility in parliamentary systems (Whitten and 
Palmer 1999; Nadeau 2002; Hellwig and Samuels 2008). The findings of this study 
might point out that Dutch voters find it particularly difficult to appoint the most 
responsible political entity after a crisis, mainly because the distribution of roles of 
political institutions in political situations is fragmented. This demonstrates that the 
phenomenon is likely to have a different impact in diverse political systems. To test 
this assumption a comparative study should be executed in which rally-events are 
included that have direct impact on countries with different political systems. Such a 
scenario, however, is rather unlikely to appear as in most rally-events only one 
country is directly involved. 
 
Another suggestion for explaining the findings of this study is a possible cautiousness 
of the Dutch public to automatically reward political institutions for dramatic events 
in which the Dutch are involved. Instead of ending up in an emotional rash of 
patriotic enthusiasm and rewarding political institutions after crises take place, the 
Dutch public might process these happenings more critically or seeks other ways to 
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process dramatic events diminishing the significance of statements from political 
institutions. Despite the inadequate knowledge of the specifications of events, the 
Dutch public may adopt a reasonable and prudent stance towards the political 
involvement in the event. This line of thought is also used in recent studies on the 
applicability of the phenomenon in the United Kingdom, another parliamentary 
system (Bronski and Way 2003). Because this is merely an assumption, more in-depth 
research is required to learn more about the characteristics of the Dutch voter. 
 
The limited availability of useful appropriate historical data on the indicators used in 
this study is the third, and final, possible explanation for the findings in this study. 
Compared to other studies on the “rally-‘round-the-flag”-effect, the timespan of 
fifteen years on which this research has focused is rather incomprehensive. Although 
it is no certainty that a more comprehensive study, with more rally-events included, 
will show different results, the findings deriving from such a study would solidify 
statements about the workings of the rally-phenomenon in the Netherlands and in 
parliamentary systems in general. Although this study is confined by some 
limitations, it can be considered as the first serious attempt to observe potential 
reflexes to crises in the Netherlands.   
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